

WP3 - Management incentives and fishermen behavioural responses

WP3 Lead partner: Landbouw Economisch Instituut (LEI)

Other partners involved: vTI, AAU, UCPH, DTU Aqua, HCMR, IFREMER, IREPA onlus, IoES, KTU, CEMARE, NUIG, CAU, MI, AZTI-Tecnalia, JRC, PMA, Kutterfisch, LF, Nissen, CsC, MAS

WP3 Lead contact person: Birgit de Vos

Contact details of coordinator: Birgit.devos@wur.nl

Summary

The Case Studies fishermen will be integrated in the scientific work to explore fishermen incentives and behavioural responses in the different management measures. The incentive structure and associated behavioural responses of fishers will be analysed using four different method, according to the Case Study leader requirements: 1) The collection and evaluation of existing literature in the area, 2) the interviews with fishers and with people surrounding fishers, 3) the utilisation of discrete choice models and 4) the utilisation of the game table approach “ecoOcean”. Each case study follows the same line of thinking in order to be able to make generalisation afterwards.

Objectives

1. Analyse which management measures at which organizational level, create the right incentives to tackle the main structural failings mentioned in the Green Paper of the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
2. Analyse how instrumental factors, such as technical measures (e.g. mesh sizes), command and control instruments (e.g. TACs and quotas, effort), market instruments (e.g. transferability of collective or individual rights) and social instruments (self- or co-management possibilities) influence fishermen’s (compliance/incentive) behaviour.
3. Analyse how non-instrumental factors, such as market factors (prices, certification, alternative employment), biological factors (fish stock condition and distribution), and social factors (peer pressure, succession issues, and gender aspects) influence fishermen’s (compliance/incentive) behaviour.

Tasks

Task 3.1 Review of literature on instrumental and non-instrumental factors and the incentives these create.

Task 3.2 Analysis of the CFP incentive structure in the past and present how these, in combination with non-instrumental factors, have affected fishers’ behaviour

Task 3.3 Analysis of management measures and incentive structure, future options in the CFP.